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Abstract
This paper uses representative firm level panel data of 1,701 Bulgarian and
2,047 Romanian manufacturing firms to estimate price-cost margins and to
analyze how these are affected by privatization and increased competitive
pressure. The estimation method used, which is based on Roeger (1995), deals
with potential endogeneity problems that are associated with estimating firm
performance, by making use of the properties of the primal and dual Solow
residual.
We find that privatization is associated with higher price-cost margins in both
Bulgaria and Romania. Moreover, foreign owned firms have higher markups than
domestic privatized firms. Our results suggest that the sequencing of reforms,
such as demonopolization prior to privatization and the establishment of
competition policy, may be important. In addition, our results give support to the
idea that opening to trade has a disciplining effect on firms’ market power. We
find that increased import penetration is associated with lower price-cost margins
in sectors where product market concentration is relatively high.
Our results can be of relevance for other emerging economies, such as China
and Vietnam, which still have to undergo major privatization programs.
Keywords: market power, privatization, firm performance, transition
JEL Code: L1, L33, P3, P54
I.  Introduction
The transition from a centrally planned to a market economy in Central and
Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union offers a unique natural experiment to
analyze the effects of privatization and the emergence of competitive pressure on firm
behavior. This paper uses representative firm level data of two emerging economies,
Bulgaria and Romania, to study how privatization and competitive pressure has had
an effect on price-cost margins. The methodology that we use, based on Roeger
(1995), has the advantage that it allows estimation of price-cost margins consistently,
without having to appeal to instrumental variables techniques. This is a major
advantage when instrumental variables are hard to find as is often the case in micro
data. This approach can therefore be placed in the recent set of papers that aim to
estimate total factor productivity consistently as in Olley and Pakes (1996) and
Levinsohn and Petrin (2002).
This paper is motivated by the rapid institutional changes that characterized most
of the transition economies in the 1990s. Under communism, the Central Planner’s
bias in favor of large scale production facilities resulted in a distorted firm size
distribution relative to the one in market economies. For instance, while at the start of
the transition process in most Central and Eastern European countries between 80 and
97% of the workforce was employed in companies with 500 or more workers, in most
of the West European market economies this fraction varied between 40 and 62%
(Roland, 2000).  The transition process from plan to market consisted of rapid price
liberalization, by the removal of price controls and direct subsidies, and the creation
of a large private sector, by allowing new firm start-ups and privatizing the state
sector. It is often argued in theoretical discussions of privatization of state owned5
enterprises in Central and Eastern Europe that institutional restructuring should
precede privatization
2. Restructuring, i.e. breaking-up large state owned enterprises
before privatization takes place, is required both to enhance organizational efficiency
as well as to create market structures, which are reasonably competitive. Tirole (1991)
among others has argued that privatization without first ‘de-monopolization’ would
create a market dominated by private firms with considerable market power
(monopoly power) as under central planning many products were produced by only a
few production entities and imports were unlikely to be a significant competitive
constraint. Li (1999) shows that the rapid decentralization and privatization of the
state monopolized industrial structure can contribute to the high output collapse
observed in many transition economies.  Joskow and Schmalensee (1995) and Joskow
et al. (1994) point out that in the case of Russia product-level concentration of
production created potential monopoly problems. While restructuring prior to
privatization would have been desirable in Russia, political and informational
constraints precluded widespread restructuring before privatization. This provides an
argument for critics of privatization: If governments are concerned with maximizing
social welfare state owned enterprises are likely to price close to marginal costs.
Simply transferring the state sector to the private sector without first breaking-up
these large firms could lead to substantial market power in firms in pursuit of profit
maximization at the expense of social welfare. Lizal, Singer and Svejnar (2001) study
the effects of enterprise break-ups in Czechoslovakia and point out the important
countervailing effect brought about by increased competition stemming from the
break-ups of large firms with monopolistic power and from the opening up of the
formerly planned economies to world trade.
                                                
2 For a recent survey on the political economy of transition, discussing the sequencing of reforms,  see6
While a number of papers have studied the effects of privatization and
competitive pressure on firm performance
3 in transition economies (see for an
excellent survey Djankov and Murrell, 2002), there is hardly any work that analyzes
these effects on the price-cost margins of firms, which is a measure for market power,
in transition economies. This paper fills this gap and studies whether privatization of
state owned enterprises has been associated with increased price-cost margins of firms
in emerging economies. In addition, we investigate whether the opening up to trade
and in particular the increased import competition has had an effect on price-cost
margins. The results in this paper can be interpreted as an analysis of the effects of
privatization on allocative efficiency (i.e. pricing at marginal costs) and could provide
an argument for sequencing of reforms
4, which may be relevant for other emerging
economies that still have to undergo massive privatization programs, such as China
and Vietnam.  Alternatively, the results may be interpreted as an analysis of
privatization and competitive pressure on firm performance, measured by price
markups.
A number of papers so far have focused on the effects of privatization on firm
performance, where performance is measured either by sales growth, the number of
layoffs, labor productivity or total factor productivity
5. An important problem with
this work has been the potential endogeneity related to the explanatory variables in
the various models. For instance, unobserved productivity shocks may have an effect
both on the input factors and the output, which can lead to biased estimates in total
factor productivity. Finding good instruments turns out to be very difficult as argued
                                                                                                                                           
Roland (2002)
3 Firm performance in these studies is measured in an ad hoc way by growth in sales, number of layoffs
or labor productivity.
4 For a theoretical discussion of sequencing of reforms see Dewatripont and Roland (1992, 1995).7
by Olley and Pakes (1996) and Levinsohn and Petrin (2002). Furthermore, if private
ownership and productivity shocks are correlated, the effect of privatization is not
correctly estimated either. This paper, in contrast, estimates the price-cost margins of
firms by using a method that avoids such endogeneity problems. We estimate price-
cost margins using a method proposed by Roeger (1995) which is based on Hall’s
(1988) method of estimating price-cost margins and on exploiting properties of the
primal and dual Solow residual. An additional advantage of this method is that it
allows us to use the nominal value of data on sales and input factors, without having
to deflate them with a price deflator. This is important because in an emerging
economy it is not always clear what the appropriate price deflator should be, given
that prices were only recently liberalized and that prices themselves are outcomes of
firm behavior.
We use a representative sample of 1,701 Bulgarian and 2,047 Romanian
manufacturing firms to estimate the price-cost margins of privatized, state owned and
foreign owned firms
6. Previous studies mostly had to rely on small samples of firms -
usually of a few hundreds - collected through surveys  (Hersch et al. , 1993; Frydman
et al. 1999; Walsh and Whelan, 2001). The sample in this paper contains virtually the
entire population of medium and large sized enterprises in manufacturing in Bulgaria
and Romania. Our observations cover the period 1994-98, however, the information
available for ownership (the fraction of shares held by private domestic owners,
foreign owners and the state) refers only to the years 1997 and 1998. This apparent
weakness of the data on ownership is not that serious as all firms in Bulgaria and
Romania were initially state owned enterprises and most of the privatizations took
                                                                                                                                           
5 La Porta and Lopez-De-Silanes (1999) for Mexico, Kocenda and Svejnar (2002) for the Czech
Republic, Frydman et al. (1999) , Claessens and Djankov (2001) and Walsh and Whelan (2001) for
various transition economies.8
place in the second half of the 1990s. Claessens and Djankov (2001) point out that
Bulgaria and Romania privatized only 6.8% and 7.3% of their manufacturing sector
during the period 1992-95. Furthermore, the fact that we still have two  years of
ownership information allows us to control for unobserved firm level fixed effects in
our analysis, which may capture potential firm level heterogeneity or selectivity
effects of ownership changes, not captured by our estimation methodology.
The fact that we are able to make a distinction between privatized, foreign and
state owned firms, allows us to assess whether foreign ownership is associated with
higher price-cost margins relative to domestic private ownership and state ownership.
In the context of transition economies this distinction may be relevant as most of the
privatization took place through voucher give-away schemes, resulting in insider
(employee) owned firms, which arguably did not affect firm behavior in a substantial
way at least not early on in the transition (Boycko, Shleifer and Vishny, 1996; Estrin,
2002). Foreign ownership can be viewed as an ownership structure characterized by
outside owners, which may have different effects on firms’ pricing behavior than
domestic privatized firms (Frydman et al, 1999).
 Our main findings can be summarized as follows. We find that privatization is
associated with higher price-cost margins relative to state owned enterprises.
Furthermore, we find that foreign owned firms have the highest market power. We
also find that international competition, measured by import penetration reduces
price-cost margins especially in highly concentrated sectors. Our results are robust to
various estimation techniques and specifications.
                                                                                                                                           
6 This number reduces in the analysis as we make use of information of the capital stock in firms,
which is often missing.9
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. The next section describes the
econometric approach. Section III discusses the data that we use and section IV gives
the results. Section V concludes the paper.
II.  Background and Econometric Model
II.1 The model
Our methodology is based on Roeger (1995), which starts from the approach that
Hall (1988) introduced to estimate total factor productivity, showing that the presence
of market power in firms requires an adjustment in the computation of total factor
productivity. Roeger’s work was motivated by the apparent low correlation between
the primal and dual Solow residual. He shows that this lack of correlation can mostly
be explained by the presence of market power in firms. In doing so, however, Roeger
also introduced a very elegant way to estimate price-cost margins in a consistent way,
without having to worry about potential correlations between the unobserved
productivity shocks and the input factors of production. This section introduces this
methodology
7.
 We start from a standard production function  () it it it it it M K N F Q , , Θ = , where i is
a firm index for the firm, t is a time index, Q stands for output, F is a production
                                                
7 Konings and Vandenbussche (2002) use the same approach to estimate the effects of anti-dumping
protection on firms’ market power. A maintained assumption in this approach is one of profit and cost10
function, Θ is Hicks neutral technological progress, N is labor input, K is capital input
and M is material input. Assuming constant returns to scale and perfect competition
the growth rate of output (the Solow output decomposition) is:
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Under imperfect competition. Eq. (1) becomes (Hall, 1988):
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=  is the price-cost margin or Lerner index of firm i at time
t, where cit stands for the marginal cost of firm i at time t. The problem in estimating
                                                                                                                                           
minimization. Evidence for transition economies shows that early on in the transition firms did move to
profit maximization strategies (e.g. Lizal and Svejnar, 2002)11
(2) or (3) as in Levinsohn (1993) and Harrison (1994) is that unobserved productivity
shocks, captured by  it ϑ , may be correlated with the input factors, K, M and N. One
way to deal with this problem is to use instrumental variables. However, the difficulty
exists often exactly in finding good instruments. Fixed effects can be used if the
nature of the endogeneity is assumed to be constant over time. Some recent solutions
have been proposed to deal with this problem in estimating production functions.
Olley and Pakes (1996) show how to use investment to control for the potential
correlation between input levels and the unobserved firm specific productivity shocks.
Levinsohn and Petrin (2002) demonstrate that like investment, intermediate inputs can
also solve this simultaneity problem. While these new approaches to estimate
production functions seem very fruitful and have been used to study the impact of
trade liberalization on productivity performance as in Pavcnik (2002), the maintained
assumption is that perfect competition characterizes the product market. Our concern
regarding the Central and East European economies we are studying here, Bulgaria
and Romania, however, is to analyze whether privatization and increased competitive
pressure have had an effect on the price-cost margins of firms. So, we are interested in
whether firms deviate from pricing behavior that exists under perfect competition.
To deal with the potential endogeneity of the error term in (3) we follow
Roeger (1995) by using a similar expression as in (3), but derived from the price
based or dual Solow residual:
(4)
                                                                                                                                           
8 Note that under constant returns to scale and imperfect competition αn+αm+αk=1/μ12
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Then subtracting (4) from (3) we get:
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Note that the error term capturing unobserved productivity shocks has cancelled out
and therefore β , the Lerner index, can consistently be estimated using OLS.
Rewriting the left hand side as  y ∆ , which is the difference between the primal
and the dual Solow residual, and the right hand side as  x ∆ , we obtain a very simple
testable equation:
(5’)  it it it it x y ε β + ∆ = ∆ ,
where εit is a white noise error term. Strictly speaking, the error term, εit , should be
zero given that the productivity shocks in (5) cancelled out. However, as pointed out
by Roeger (1995), there may be a number of reasons for having a non-zero error term
in (5’). Mismeasurement of the labor input is one potential source for a non-zero error
term. In particular, we measure labor input as the number of workers in a particular
firm, without taking into account the number of hours they work. Since hours worked13
appear only on the left hand side of equation (5), these measurement errors do not
constitute a problem for the estimations. Another source of a non-zero error term
could be due to misspecification analysis, in particular, the presence of excess
capacity and labor hoarding could result in a different specification. Roeger (1995)
points out that both in the case of excess capacity and labor hoarding the difference
between the primal and the dual Solow residual is cyclical, which would be captured
by the error term.  We will use year dummies to capture such potential demand
effects.We shall use Eq. (5’) to estimate price-cost margins, captured by βit = (Pit –
cit)/Pit , as an indicator of market power. To assess the effect of trade, concentration
and ownership, we interact  x ∆  with sector level data about concentration, import
shares, and firm level information about ownership
9.
The Roeger (1995) method is particularly well suited to estimate market
power in firms if one has access to company accounts data where both output and
input factors are reported in nominal values. Deflation of variables using price
indexes is no longer needed in order to estimate price-cost margins. There exist also a
number of alternative, complementary approaches to estimate markups as discussed in
Bresnahan (1989), which we will not pursue here
10. These alternative approaches
require price information in order to estimate demand functions directly, while we
have access to the actual company account data, which does not contain sufficient
information to estimate demand functions. The fact that we use company accounts
data also implies that we are not able to trace the financial flows associated with
individual products and as we have data of medium and large sized firms they are
likely to be multi-product firms. Nevertheless, it is reasonable to assume that if a firm
                                                
9 This means that we assume that market power varies with ownership and competition, which implies
that we need to add these variables separately as well in equation (5’), apart from the interactions with
∆x (see Oliveira Martins and Scarpetta, 1999).
10 For a recent application of these alternative methods see Verboven (2002).14
has product market power over one of its product it is likely to have market power
over its other products as well. Alternatively, we can view our estimates of price-cost
margins as an average firm effect, which is the focus of our paper: We want to assess
whether the big institutional changes, like privatization and the opening up of markets
to international trade, have had an impact on the average price-cost margins of firms
in transition economies.
Equation (5) shows that in order to obtain an estimate of the price-cost margin,
we need information on sales growth
11, growth in the wage bill, growth in material
costs and growth in the value of capital
12. The company accounts information we have
of Bulgarian and Romanian firms allowed us to get firm level data on these variables.
The profit and loss account provided us the information on sales, the wage bill and
material costs in consecutive years.
13 For capital we used the book value of the fixed
tangible assets taken from the balance sheet, for the rental price of capital (PKit) we
followed Jorgenson and Hall (1967) and Hsieh (2002), or PKit = PI(rit+δit), where  I P
stands for the index of investment goods prices, measured at the country level, rit
stands for the real interest rate for each period, δ  stands for the depreciation rate,
measured at the firm level (see data appendix for details on sources). The Roeger
method assumes that capital is flexible and that a change in the value of capital may
be associated with a change in the marginal costs. We have also experimented with
assuming that capital is fixed, but this does not alter our basic results (reported in
tables A1 and A2 of the appendix).
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12 Sales refers to Pit.Qit; the wage bill to PNitNit; material costs are PMit.Mit and the value of capital is
PKit.Kit.
13 The Profit & Loss account for European firms can be compared to the Income Statement for US
firms.15
For empirical tractability we further need to make the assumption, as is done
in all applications of this type (see Levinsohn, 1993 for further arguments) that the
markups are the same for all firms within the same sector. It is not possible to
estimate for each firm separately a markup because we would not have enough
degrees of freedom.
II.2 Hypotheses
We seek to test two key hypotheses which are of general relevance, also for
market economies: Our first hypothesis that we seek to test is related to the ownership
structure of firms. If the government is concerned about allocative efficiency, we
would expect that state firms would set prices close to marginal costs. State owned
enterprises are considered to cure market failures by implementing pricing policies
that take account of social marginal costs (Shapiro and Willig, 1990). Given that the
communist economies were characterized by state monopolies and mass privatization
often took place without breaking up the firms in smaller units prior to privatization
we may expect that price-cost margins will increase after privatization. Furthermore,
transition implied a move from revenue maximization under soft budget constraints,
to profit maximization under hard budget constraints, which is likely to give rise to
different pricing behavior of privatized firms (Estrin and Hare, 1992). There has been
a debate, however, about the relative performance of privatized versus state firms.
While some papers show there is not much difference between these two categories
because most of the privatization occurred through give away schemes, others
demonstrate that privatization has led to better firm performance (Frydman et al,
1997; for an overview see Estrin, 2002). An alternative way of interpreting this first16
hypothesis is that we are testing the relative performance of firms as a function of the
ownership structure, where performance is measured as the price-cost margin of
firms. If privatized firms engage in more restructuring, relative to state owned
enterprises, costs may be reduced more without falling prices. This would also result
in a higher price-cost margin. In testing this hypothesis we will make a distinction
between domestic private owned firms and foreign firms.
Our second hypothesis is related to the effects of increased competitive
pressure on market power. It is generally believed that increased competitive pressure
should discipline firm pricing behavior. Levinsohn (1993), Harrison (1994), Krishna
and Mitra (1998) all report pricing behavior closer to marginal costs when firms are
exposed to more import competition. Konings and Vandenbussche (2002) find
evidence that firms’ market power increases once they enjoy protection from
international competition. To test whether increased competitive pressure in transition
countries has had an impact on the pricing behavior of firms we use two measures to
proxy for competitive pressure. The first relates to domestic competition and is the
three digit Herfindahl index of concentration. For homogeneous oligopoly models it
can be shown that there exists a negative relationship between the number of firms in
an industry and the price-cost margin (e.g. Sutton, 1991). There exists also empirical
evidence that concentration is positively related to price-cost margins (e.g. Domowitz
et al, 1988). Our second measure of competitive pressure relates to international
competition, which we measure by import penetration at the three digit NACE level
14.
We expect import penetration to have a negative impact on price-cost margins,
yielding more competitive pricing behavior of firms (e.g. Tybout, 2001).
                                                
14 The Nace classification level is the European system of classifying sectors,.17
We test these hypotheses by interacting in equation (5’) Δx with the various
proxies for competitive pressure and ownership. This allows us to test directly
whether competitive pressure and ownership matters for the average price-cost margin
in firms. Or equation (5’) can be written as
(6)  
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where HERFjt stands for the Herfindahl index of concentration in sector j at time t,
measured at the three digit NACE level of industrial classification, IMPjt stands for
the import penetration in sector j at time t, measured at the three digit NACE level,
PRIVit is a dummy equal to one if the firm i is owned for more than 50% by private
domestic shareholders in year t, FORit is a dummy equal to one if the firm is owned
for more than 50% by foreign shareholders in year t. We also experimented with
using the full fraction of shares held by each ownership category, rather than a
dummy indicating majority ownership. Finally, εit is a white noise error term. We
include the ownership variables and competition variables also separately in (6) to
capture any difference between the primal and the dual Solow residual that is not
explained by market power. Equation (6) is estimated using OLS and fixed effects
estimators. The latter may capture any unobserved firm level heterogeneity and
measurement error that is constant over time. In our regressions we will also include
year dummies to control for common aggregate shocks.18
III.  Data
III.1. Background on Bulgaria and Romania
Both Bulgaria and Romania are former Soviet economies that like the other
Central and East European emerging economies started market oriented reforms in the
early 1990s. However, unlike other emerging economies of Central and Eastern
Europe, such as Hungary, Poland and the Czech Republic, the planned reforms were
often postponed or there was no clear-cut policy due to political instability. Like most
transition economies, Bulgaria and Romania suffered from a steep output collapse in
the early 1990s and a slow recovery thereafter. However, in both countries current
real GDP levels are still below their pre-transition level of real GDP. Bulgaria is a
small open economy with a population of 8 million and GDP per capita of 1,513 USD
in 1999. Its trade share in GDP is 73%. Romania is a larger economy with a
population of 22.3 million and GDP per capita of 1,512 USD in 1999 (EBRD, 2002).
Its trade share in GDP is 53%.
Both countries can be considered as slow reformers, lagging behind the other
transition economies. This is also one of the reasons why Bulgaria and Romania are
no part of the first wave of Central and East European countries joining the EU. Both
countries are very comparable in terms of implementing institutional reforms. Both
countries have installed competition policy authorities, but its effectiveness has not
been very high, as indicated by the EBRD index of competition policy. This index is
based on an in depth survey of various competition policy actions in the transition
economies. Bulgaria, just as Romania, has a score of 2.3 out of a maximum score of
5, in 1999 (EBRD, 2002). In both countries enterprise reforms were slow to occur.19
Despite the significant progress in building the legislative and regulatory framework
to support private sector activity towards the end of the 1990s, there is still a
significant scope to improve the effectiveness of its application and implementation.
Both countries still have to go through a number of privatization rounds of their state
owned enterprises. By 1999, 70% of GDP in Bulgaria was produced in the private
sector (i.e. privatized and de novo private firms), this compares to 60% in Romania.
III.2. The Firm Level Data
We make use of a commercial data base of company accounts, comparable to
other company account data sets such as the Compustat data base in the US or the
Exstat data base in the UK. The data base is commercialized under the name
“Amadeus” by Bureau Van Dijk (BvD), a firm listed on the Brussels’ Stock
Exchange, specialized in harmonizing and uniformizing company accounts data of
European firms. The Amadeus data include the information of the balance sheets and
income statements of companies above a certain size in the EU and in a number of
Central and Eastern Europe. The quality of the data of Romanian and Bulgarian firms
is among the best in the Amadeus data set. We checked this by taking random
samples of firms to verify the consistency and accuracy of reporting. We verified this
by checking annual reports of firms and we conducted a number of postal surveys in
which we inquired after the value of a number of variables and compared them with
what was reported in the Amadeus files. Finally, we also compared our data with data
from the official yearbooks to check the representativeness. Furthermore, incentives
to misreport information by companies are minimal as this is regarded as fraud which
may lead to substantial fines. Even in case that there was some underreporting of20
some values, like the official wage bill or the number of employees working in the
firm, our method of estimation may capture some of that by using fixed effects
estimations.
 We retrieved detailed information of 2,047 Romanian firms and 1,701 Bulgarian
firms that operate in the manufacturing sector between 1994 and 1998.  The data were
provided to BvD by the Chamber of Commerce and Industry in Romania and
Creditreform in Bulgaria. All the variables are taken from the annual company
accounts which were made consistent across countries by BvD. To be included in
“Amadeus” at least one of the following criteria has to be satisfied: employees greater
than 100, total assets and sales exceed 8 and 16 million USD, respectively.  These
inclusion criteria suggest that we would only capture the medium and large firms. In
tables 1 and 2 we compare the employment and sales coverage of the Amadeus data
for Bulgaria and Romania with the total employment and sales in manufacturing
reported in the statistical yearbooks of these two countries. We note that our data
cover most of the employment and sales in manufacturing in both countries. In table 2
we can also see that the Amadeus data are quite representative at the 2 digit NACE
sector level. So despite the inclusion criteria it seems that we are using a
representative firm level data set for Bulgarian and Romanian manufacturing firms.
This is not surprising as the size distribution of firms in the emerging countries is
skewed in favor of the medium and large firms. In our analysis, the number of firms
used drops as we require information on the capital stock in firms, which is often not
provided. We also experimented with estimates not using the capital stock and our
basic results remained qualitatively the same.
The company accounts data cover the period 1994-98. Apart from the standard
data provided in company accounts, the data also includes information on the21
ownership structure of firms, however, as mentioned before, this information was
only available for the years 1997 and 1998. So, our main analysis that relates to the
ownership effects will only refer to the years 1997 and 1998. While it would have
been interesting to analyze the effects of ownership on market power from 1994
onwards, most of the privatizations in Bulgaria and Romania started only after 1996.
Claessens and Djankov (2001) pointed out that only around 7% of the state owned
enterprises in manufacturing was privatized in the first half of the 1990s while the
mass privatizations started only from 1997 onwards. To check the robustness of our
results we will also report estimates for the entire sample period 1994-98 making the
assumption that all firms before 1997 in our sample were still state owned. This is
likely to bias our results in favor of finding no effect of privatization, given that it is
realistic to believe that a number of the firms in our sample were already privatized.
Nevertheless, given that we have a representative sample it is also likely that it is only
a small fraction of firms that are not measured correctly. This exercise is just done as
a robustness check for our main results, which refer to the years 1997 and 1998, the
years for which we have full information on the ownership status of firms.
  The information on ownership is collected directly from the companies.
Furthermore BvD merges the ownership data it receives from all its information
providers (including those of all other European countries) into one big database. This
information is then analyzed to identify each cross border holding/subsidiary link by
the national identification number of the companies involved. This allows us to have
information about the nationality of the ownership, foreign or domestic. Firms for
which we could not trace ownership information in the Amadeus data set were
dropped from the analysis. Thus the ownership information that we use, should be a22
good measure of whether a firm is domestically private owned, foreign owned or state
owned.
In particular, we know the fraction of shares in the firm that is owned by the state,
by the private domestic investors and by foreigners. Table 3 shows the average
fraction of shares held in each category in the sample. Note that the average fraction
of shares held by private domestic owners is 65% in Bulgaria and 50% in Romania .
If we look at shareholding in private firms only we observe that private investors
retain on average 80% of the total shares in private firms in Bulgaria and 58% in
Romania. The fraction of shares held by foreign owners is only 4% on average in
Bulgaria, while this is 10% in Romania. This reflects the relative small fraction of
firms that do have some foreign participation. However, if we look at the average
fraction of shares held by foreign owners in firms with some foreign participation
only, then the average foreign share holding is larger than 65% in both countries. In
our analysis we use categorical variables for each ownership category, defined
according to majority ownership stakes. Table 4 shows the fraction of firms in our
sample that can be classified as majority owned private, majority owned foreign and
majority owned state firms. Note that the presence of majority owned state firms in
Romania (42%) is more important than in Bulgaria (21%). Based on our sample, for
Bulgaria 73% of total value added in manufacturing is produced by the private sector
in 1998 (59% in 1997), which accounts for 72% of total employment in
manufacturing in 1998 (59% in 1997). This compares with official numbers reported
by the EBRD of a private sector share in GDP of 65% and a private sector share in
employment of 61% in 1998. In Romania the private sector share of value added in
our sample corresponds to 52% in 1998 (45% in 1997) and the employment share to23
42% in 1998 (42% in 1997). This compares with official numbers in 1998 of 60% and
62% respectively.
In table 5 we show the summary statistics of the variables retrieved from the
company accounts. The data appendix describes the definitions and measurement
issues of the various variables that we employ. We note that the average firm size in
terms of employment is about the same in Bulgaria and Romania. Furthermore,
foreign and state firms are larger in terms of employment on average than private
domestic ones. We can also note that the sales revenue for foreign firms, both in
Bulgaria and Romania is the largest.
IV. Results
IV.1 Basic Estimates of Price-Cost Margins
We first start with reporting the estimates of firms’ price-cost margins for both
countries based on estimating equation (5’) using a fixed effects estimator
15. We
estimate equation (5’) using fixed effects to control for potential firm heterogeneity
and measurement error that may be present in the data. We experimented also with
simple OLS estimates, but that gave qualitatively the same results. For our main
analyses we will report both OLS and Fixed Effects estimates. Furthermore, all
equations include year dummies to control for macro demand shocks. In tables 6 and
7 we report estimates of average price-cost margins for the entire manufacturing
sector and for each individual sector separately for Bulgaria and Romania
respectively.  We can note that on average the estimated price-cost margin in24
Bulgarian manufacturing, with an estimated price-cost margin or Lerner index of
17%, is higher than the one in Romanian manufacturing, with a Lerner index of only
7%. We also computed the rank correlation between the Bulgarian and Romanian
price-cost margins in each two digit sector to check whether similar sectors would
have similar markups across countries, which would suggest that market power to a
large extent is determined by technological factors characterizing the particular sector,
rather than institutional factors. The spearman rank correlation between the estimated
price-cost margins in Romania and Bulgaria is -0.012 and not statistically significant.
This suggests that institutional differences, such as the degree of privatization and the
opening up to international competition that characterize the different countries are
likely to be more important for explaining differences in price-cost margins between
the two countries. We explore these issues below in section IV.2.
In order to check whether the estimates are affected by the maintained assumption
that capital is flexible, we experimented with assuming that capital at the firm level is
fixed, which would imply that the change in capital term in equation (5) would be
equal to zero. Tables A1 and A2 report the estimates for the manufacturing sector as a
whole and for each two digit sector separately. We can note that by and large the
estimated pattern of price-cost margins in the various sectors in Bulgaria and Romania
is similar to the one reported in tables 6 and 7. For the entire manufacturing sector the
average price-cost margin is estimated at 16% in Bulgaria and 10% in Romania. This
compares to 17% and 7% respectively if the maintained assumption of a flexible
capital stock is used. Given that the capital stock is in fact fluctuating from year to
year in most firms, this is probably not a bad maintained assumption.
                                                                                                                                           
15 We also experimented with random effects, but the Hausman test rejected the random effects model25
IV.2. The Effects of Ownership and Competition on Price-Cost Margins
Because we are interested in the effects of competitive pressure and ownership
change on the average price-cost margin in firms we pool the data across sectors and
test whether the average markup varies with sector characteristics related to
competitive pressure on the one hand and with firm characteristics related to
ownership on the other hand as shown in equation (6). We measure competitive
pressure at the three digit NACE level by the Herfindahl index and by import
penetration. Tables 8 and 9 report estimates of equation (6) and slight variations of
equation (6) for Bulgaria and Romania respectively. The first column again reports
the estimate of the price-cost margin for the entire manufacturing sector, using both
OLS and Fixed Effects, yielding virtually the same estimate. In the second column we
test whether competitive pressure and ownership effects alter the estimated price-cost
margin, while in the third column we add an interaction term between import
penetration and product market concentration to test whether import competition has
different effects in highly concentrated sector. We focus our discussion on the fixed
effects results reported in column (3) of tables 8 and 9, which is our most preferred
model given that it yields the best fit and seems to capture the most important effects.
The ownership categories in that column are defined as dummies reflecting majority
ownership stakes. We also experimented with using the actual fraction of shares
owned by each category, but our results remained the same. For Bulgaria in table 8,
we can note that the average price-cost margin, β1, is estimated at 12%. However, the
price-cost margin varies with the level of concentration in sectors. The positive effect
of  β3 indicates that sectors with a higher Herfindahl index of concentration are
                                                                                                                                           
in favor of the fixed effects model.26
characterized by higher price-cost margins, as we would expect. The average
Herfindahl index in 1998 is 18% in Bulgaria, this compares to an average Herfindahl
index of 30% in 1995. So sectors are becoming more competitive over time. The
coefficient of 0.226 suggests that a reduction in product market concentration of 10
percentage points is equivalent to a reduction in the average price-cost margin of 2.2
percentage points.  Also in Romania (table 9) we find that product market
concentration and price-cost margins are positively correlated. The magnitude,
however, is larger in Romania. The point estimate is 0.36, which would mean that a
reduction in product market concentration of 10 percentage points would be
associated with a drop in the average market power of 3.6 percentage points. The
average Herfindahl index in Romania has declined from 17% in 1996 (the first year
for which we had information on the Herfindahl index in Romania) to 14% in 1998.
The fact that product market concentration in Romania is lower on average than in
Bulgaria could be part of the explanation of the low average Lerner index in the
Romanian manufacturing sector relative to the Bulgarian one.
The effect of international competition are given by β2,  For Bulgaria, in table 8,
we find no statistically significant direct effect of import penetration on the price-cost
margins of firms in column (3), while in Romania (table 9) the direct effect of import
penetration is even positive, with a point estimate of 0.035. This seems to provide
some evidence for the fact that international competition is not sufficient to lower
market power of firms. However, when we look at the interaction between the
Herfindahl index and import penetration, captured by β6, we find that import
penetration does have a disciplining effect on firm’s price-cost margins, both in
Bulgaria and in Romania. The negative coefficient indicates that the positive effect on
price-cost margins of product market concentration, captured by β3, is reduced by27
increased imports. In other words, international competition seems to discipline firm
behavior especially in highly concentrated sectors. Thus in sectors where domestic
competition was traditionally weak, reflected in high concentration levels, opening up
to trade helps to enhance pricing closer to marginal costs. For Romania the positive
direct effect of import penetration has a low point estimate, nevertheless, it indicates
that in highly competitive sectors, i.e. where domestic product market concentration is
low, increased imports in fact is associated with increased price-cost margins. This
may in fact reflect that most of the effect of increased international competition feeds
through the effects on generating cost-cutting strategies. Especially in sectors where
competition is already high, increased international competition can push firms to
lower their marginal costs and therefore markups go up. In contrast, in sectors where
domestic competition is weaker the effect on pricing behavior, rather than on cost
cutting strategies, may dominate.
We next look at the effects of ownership. Again we focus on our results obtained
from the fixed effects model, although the results based on OLS are very similar.
Fixed effects may capture some potential selection effects, not captured by our
estimation method, or political lobbying which may have an effect on the ownership
structure of firms, but which is not observable. By including fixed effects we
indirectly control for such factors. For Bulgaria, in table 8, we find that domestically
owned private firms have higher price-cost margins, captured by β4. The point
estimate of 0.037 suggests that privatization is associated with an increase in the
average price-cost margin to 16% (0.124+0.037). Also the effect of foreign
ownership, captured by β5, indicates that foreign participation is associated with
higher price-cost margins compared to state firms. A point estimate of 0.071 suggests
that the average price-cost margin in foreign firms in Bulgaria is almost 20%.  We28
also experimented with using the actual ownership shares, rather than just ownership
dummies, not reported here for brevity. Our ownership results were unaffected.
Adachi (2000) shows theoretically that when there exists a cost difference above a
certain threshold value between domestic firms and foreign entrants, foreign entrants
increasingly exploit their cost advantage by raising price rather than investing in
market share. That is, if the domestic firms have a high cost of production,
irrespective of the degree of industry concentration, the foreign entrants do not price
aggressively because their opponents are weak rivals. This explanation is in line with
our findings.
In Romania, in table 9, we find similar results. Both private domestic firms and
foreign owned firms have higher price-cost margins relative to state ownership
enterprises. The estimated price-cost margin of privatized domestic firms in Romania
is on average 13.5%, very similar to the price-cost margin of privatized firms in
Bulgaria. Also in Romania, the price-cost margin of foreign firms is higher on
average and estimated at 15%. These results also hold up if we use the entire fraction
of shares held by each ownership type, not reported here for brevity.
In table 10 we report some further robustness checks of our results. We do two
further experiments. First, as mentioned earlier, the ownership data only refers to the
years 1997 and 1998. We have no information on the nature of ownership prior to
1997, however, from the institutional changes that took place in Bulgaria and
Romania we know that there has been limited privatization prior to 1997. We
therefore experiment with making the assumption that all firms prior to 1997 were
state owned. While this is clearly a wrong assumption as some firms have been
privatized prior to 1997, the results should not be too different given that most of the
privatizations took place from 1997 on. Any effect that we pick up should be a lower29
bound to the true effect of privatization on price-cost margins. The results for the full
sample are reported in table 10. Our earlier results are confirmed. Privatization is
associated with higher price-cost margins and the largest effect is with foreign
ownership. We also experimented with just using a balanced panel, not reported here
for brevity, again our main results remain robust. Privatization is associated with
higher price-cost margins and increased international competitive pressure is
associated with lower price-cost margins, especially in highly concentrated sectors.
Our findings in this paper are in line with our priors: We would expect that state
owned enterprises price closer to marginal costs as they are concerned with
maximizing social welfare or allocative efficiency. Once state firms are being
privatized we would also expect that privatized firms, if they can exert some market
power, would increase prices above marginal costs. An alternative interpretation is
that privatized and foreign owned firms have better performance measured in terms of
their price-cost margins. Private firms are better in cutting costs relative to state firms,
the latter category often characterized by over-manning levels and x-inefficiency. In
this case, privatization would also result in higher price-cost margins. Our
methodology, however, does not allow to disentangle these two effects.
V. Conclusion
In this paper we have used representative firm level panel data to analyze how
price-cost margins vary with domestic and international competitive pressure and with
private, foreign and state ownership in Bulgarian and Romanian manufacturing
industries. We use Roeger’s (1995) method to estimate price-cost margins. This
method has several advantages. Because it is based on the difference between the30
primal and the dual Solow residual, unobserved productivity shocks cancel out, which
allows us to estimate price-cost margins consistently, without having to worry about
potential endogeneity of some of the explanatory variables used in the model.
Furthermore this method does not require deflators for the variables as the nominal
values of output are used to estimate market power. We find that the average price-
cost margin in Romania is lower than in Bulgaria. This could be due to the fact that in
Romania state ownership is still more prevalent and that state firms price closer to
marginal costs. Product market concentration in Romania is also lower on average,
which could be an additional reason why the estimated price-cost margin on average
is lower in Romania than in Bulgaria.
We further find that privatized firms, both domestically owned and foreign
owned have the higher price-cost margins relative to state firms. Furthermore, foreign
firms outperform privatized domestic ones in terms of their price-cost margins.  We
also find that imports reduce firms’ price-cost margins, especially in highly
concentrated sectors. Highly concentrated sectors are also characterized by higher
price-cost margins.
Our results indicate that privatization of large state owned enterprises could imply
losses in allocative efficiency. An alternative interpretation of our results is that
privatization is associated with firm restructuring (cutting costs), which is associated
with higher firm performance, measured by price-cost margins. The results in this
paper also suggest that sequencing of reforms may be important, which has relevance
for those countries, such as China and Vietnam, that still have to start with privatizing
their large state sector.31
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 Table 1: Comparison between Amadeus and National Statistics, 1998
Bulgaria Romania
Employment coverage .66 .70
Sales Coverage .82 .69
Note: Sales coverage ratio = total sales in Amadeus / total national sales. Employment
coverage ratio = total employment in Amadeus / total national employment.
Table 2: Sales industry coverage using Amadeus data set, 1998
Industry code Bulgaria Romania
15 .51 .60
16 .80 .96
17 1 .87
18 .44 .51
19 .57 .54
20 .51 .41
21 .76 .75
22 .55 .30
23 - 1
24 .98 .69
25 .55 .84
26 .74 .79
27 1 .45
28 .56 .51
29 .64 .76
30 .23 .88
31 1 .63
32 1 .52
33 .50 .67
34 .67 .93
35 .87 .68
36 .43 .61
37 - .75
Note: Sales coverage ratio = total industry sales in Amadeus / total national
industry sales according to the 2-digit NACE industry classification. For Bulgaria,
data on national industry sales are not available in sectors 23 and 37.35
Table 3: Average Ownership Shares in Sample
Type of firm
Bulgaria Romania
Average fraction of shares held by private
domestic owners in entire sample
Average fraction in private firms only
0.65 (0.38)
0.80 (0.24)
0.50 (0.39)
0.58 (0.36)
Average fraction of shares held by foreign
owners in entire sample
Average fraction held in foreign firms only
0.04 (0.17)
0.65 (0.26)
0.10 (0.27)
0.67 (0.29)
Average fraction of shares held by the state in
entire sample
Average fraction held in state firms only
0.30 (0.36)
0.44 (0.36)
0.31 (0.33)
0.58 (0.22)
Note: standard deviations in parentheses
Table 4: Types of Ownership (percentage of firms in the sample)
Type of firm
Bulgaria Romania
Majority  Domestic Private 74 % 47%
Majority Foreign 6% 11%
Majority State 20 % 42%36
Table 5: Summary statistics
Summary Statistics Bulgaria: Sample Means and Standard Deviations
Full sample Majority Private
domestic
Majority Foreign Majority State
Employment 493 (981) 392 (641) 730 (648) 595 (1377)
Sales 6634 (42850) 4934 (18918) 12312 (19172) 9085 (39604)
Wage Bill 876 (3250) 784 (2615) 1726 (2066) 1414 (4609)
Material Costs 4162 (31967) 2817 (13705) 7592 (13032) 5851 (27560)
Tangible Fixed
Assets
2664 (12017) 2333 (11588) 4784 (5991) 4672 (14349)
Depreciation rate 0.14 (0.22) 0.16 (0.22) 0.18 (0.15) 0.11 (0.10)
Note: Standard deviations in parentheses; values expressed in thousands of $
Summary Statistics Romania: Sample Means and Standard Deviations
Full sample Majority Private
domestic
Majority Foreign Majority State
Employment 469 (1028) 378 (699) 690 (558) 624 (1525)
Sales 7853 (52524) 5173 (21441) 10786 (11962) 9231 (43535)
Wage Bill 1012 (3901) 829 (2962) 1856 (2135) 1541 (5109)
Material Costs 5170 (39348) 3030 (15625) 7066 (8995) 6117 (30418)
Tangible Fixed
Assets
2975 (14032) 2464 (13060) 5211 (6316) 4717 (15603)
Depreciation rate 0.08 (0.17) 0.10 (0.28) 0.14 (0.15) 0.06 (0.08)
Note: Standard deviations in parentheses; values expressed in thousands of $37
Table 6
Fixed Effects Results, Bulgaria
NACE Code Description Lerner Index Nr. Obs.
- All manufacturing 0.17** (0.006) 1,763
15 Food and Beverages 0.19** (0.017) 299
16 Tobacco 0.21** (0.030) 35
17 Textiles 0.19**(0.016) 201
18 Wearing apparel; fur 0.20**(0.022) 153
19 Leather, luggage and footwear 0.19** (0.039) 62
20 Wood, straw and plaiting materials 0.06* (0.036) 40
21 Pulp, paper and paper products 0.14**(0.017) 30
22 Publishing, printing and media 0.42 (0.330) 30
23 Coke, refined petroleum products, nuclear fuel - 8
24 Chemicals and chemical products 0.19**(0.021) 94
25 Rubber and plastic products 0.24**(0.038) 38
26 Other non metallic mineral products 0.15**(0.016) 86
27 Basic metals 0.21**(0.028) 94
28 Fabricated metal products 0.17**(0.023) 113
29 Machinery and equipment n.e.c. 0.18**(0.020) 191
30 Office machinery and computers 0.19**(0.019) 6
31 Electrical machinery and apparatus n.e.c. 0.15**(0.018) 99
32 Radio, TV and communication equipment 0.40 (0.20) 24
33 Medical, precision and optical instruments 0.16** (0.026) 19
34 Motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers 0.005 (0.041) 34
35 Other transport equipment 0.27 (0.17) 16
36 Furniture, manufacturing n.e.c. 0.21** (0.036) 91
**: significant at the 1% critical level or lower; * significant at the 5% critical level or
lower38
Table 7
Fixed Effects Results, Romania
NACE Code Description Lerner Index Nr. Obs.
- All manufacturing 0.064** (0.002) 3,065
15 Food and Beverages 0.11** (0.006) 661
16 Tobacco - -
17 Textiles 0.10** (0.007) 357
18 Wearing apparel; fur 0.20**(0.015) 180
19 Leather, luggage and footwear 0.16**(0.013) 73
20 Wood, straw and plaiting materials 0.006 (0.004) 121
21 Pulp, paper and paper products 0.15**(0.033) 46
22 Publishing, printing and media 0.33**(0.046) 31
23 Coke, refined petroleum products, nuclear fuel 0.15**(0.013) 16
24 Chemicals and chemical products 0.13**(0.015) 137
25 Rubber and plastic products 0.14**(0.012) 101
26 Other non metallic mineral products 0.16**(0.006) 224
27 Basic metals 0.12**(0.009) 124
28 Fabricated metal products 0.17**(0.009) 213
29 Machinery and equipment n.e.c. 0.17**(0.006) 298
30 Office machinery and computers 0.31**(0.025) 13
31 Electrical machinery and apparatus n.e.c. 0.17**(0.008) 67
32 Radio, TV and communication equipment 0.13**(0.018) 19
33 Medical, precision and optical instruments 0.10**(0.025) 33
34 Motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers 0.17**(0.010) 79
35 Other transport equipment 0.11**(0.018) 52
36 Furniture, manufacturing n.e.c. 0.13**(0.013) 220
**: significant at the 1% critical level or lower; * significant at the 5% critical level or
lower39
Table 8
Results for Bulgaria
Estimates of equation (6)
(1) (2) (3)
OLS FE OLS FE OLS FE
β 1 0.110**
(0.004)
0.167**
(0.006)
0.122**
(0.021)
0.146**
(0.028)
0.103**
(0.021)
0.124**
(0.029)
β 2 -0.016
(0.027)
-0.021
(0.032)
0.046
(0.032)
0.059
(0.042)
β 3 0.131**
(0.051)
0.059
(0.066)
0.293**
(0.068)
0.226**
(0.087)
β 4 0.054**
(0.014)
0.037*
(0.018)
0.055**
(0.014)
0.037*
(0.018)
β 5 0.085**
(0.025)
0.077*
(0.033)
0.083**
(0.025)
0.071**
(0.032)
β 6 -0.435**
(0.124)
-0.560**
(0.195)
Year
dummies
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 within 0.71 0.77 0.78
R2 between 0.26 0.36 0.36
R2 overall 0.49 0.48 0.62 0.59 0.63 0.59
#
observations
1763 1763 1084 1084 1084 1084
Note: standard errors in parentheses, **/* denotes respectively statistical significance at 1%/5%/. The variables Import
penetration,  the Herfindahl index, private and foreign ownership are also included separately in equations (2), (3) and
(4) as additional control factors. The estimates refer to equation (6) or
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Table 9
Results for Romania
Estimates of equation (6)
(1) (2) (3)
OLS FE OLS FE OLS FE
β 1 0.065**
(0.002)
0.064**
(0.002)
0.020**
(0.002)
0.019**
(0.003)
0.016**
(0.002)
0.015**
(0.003)
β 2 0.019**
(0.003)
0.011**
(0.004)
0.045**
(0.004)
0.035**
(0.006)
β 3 0.246**
(0.030)
0.249**
(0.042)
0.360**
(0.031)
0.356**
(0.046)
β 4 0.105**
(0.005)
0.126**
(0.007)
0.098**
(0.004)
0.118**
(0.008)
β 5 0.162**
(0.016)
0.14**
(0.024)
0.153**
(0.016)
0.133**
(0.023)
β 6 - - -0.20**
(0.024)
-0.18**
(0.034)
Year
dummies
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 within 0.39 0.59 0.61
R2 between 0.30 0.38 0.39
R2 overall 0.37 0.37 0.52 0.49 0.54 0.52
#
observations
3065 3065 1748 1748 1748 1748
Note: standard errors in parentheses, **/* denotes respectively statistical significance at 1%/5%/10% The variables
Import penetration,  the Herfindahl index, private and foreign ownership are also included separately in equations (2),
(3) and (4) as additional control factors.
The estimates refer to equation (6) or
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Table 10: Robustness Checks
Fixed Effects Estimates
Bulgaria Romania
Full Sample Full Sample
β 1 0.17**
(0.01)
0.069**
(0.004)
β 2 -0.05
(0.03)
0.018**
(0.003)
β 3 0.18**
(0.08)
0.29**
(0.04)
β 4 0.03**
(0.01)
0.085**
(0.006)
β 5 0.05*
(0.03)
0.165**
(0.02)
β 6 -0.14
(0.16)
-0.07**
(0.04)
Year
dummies
Yes Yes
R2 within 0.73 0.59
R2 between 0.24 0.38
R2 overall 0.46 0.52
Nr. Of
observations
1454 2939
Note: standard errors in parentheses, **/* denotes respectively statistical significance at 5%/10% The variables Import
penetration,  the Herfindahl index, private and foreign ownership are also included separately in equations (2), (3) and
(4) as additional control factors.
The estimates refer to equation (6) or
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APPENDIX
Data Issues and Measurement of the variables
Firm level variables were computed using data from the Amadeus CD-Rom,
commercialized by Bureau Van Dijck (www.bvdep.com) :
PQ=operating revenue in thousands of local currency
PM M=CM= costs of materials in thousands of local currency
PN N=CE= cost of employees in thousands of local currency
K= net tangible fixed assets, including machinery, equipment, buildings, etc.
evaluated at book value in thousands of local currency
PQ
CE
N = α
PQ
CM
M = α
) ( it it I K r P P δ + =  where PI is the index of investment goods prices,  r is a firm
specific real interest rate, δ is a firm specific depreciation rate. The investment goods43
price index is taken from the EU AMECO data base and provided to us by Werner
Roeger.
r is defined as the ratio of interest paid over debt, minus the growth of the CPI, δ as
depreciation over tangible fixed assets of the previous year.
FOREIGN=1 if a foreign investor owns more than 50% of the shares in the firm and
equal to 0 otherwise
PRIV=1 if domestic investors own more than 50% of the shares in the firm and equal
to 0 otherwise
Sector level information was provided by the respective National Statistical Offfices:
the Herfindahl index (HERF) is the sum of squared market share in  given 3-digit
NACE Rev. 1 industry; the import share (IMP) is the ratio of imports over the sum of
domestic sales and imports also in a given 3-digit NACE Rev. 1 industry.44
Robustness Checks, assuming capital is fixed
Table A1: Estimates of Market Power in Bulgarian Manufacturing, Assuming
Capital is fixed (fixed effects results)
NACE Code Description Lerner Index Nr. Obs.
- All manufacturing 0.16** (0.009) 3756
15 Food and Beverages 0.21** (0.03) 657
16 Tobacco 0.44** (0.13) 70
17 Textiles 0.18** (0.03) 386
18 Wearing apparel; fur 0.25** (0.03) 158
19 Leather, luggage and footwear 0.20** (0.03) 122
20 Wood, straw and plaiting materials 0.12* (0.05) 98
21 Pulp, paper and paper products 0.38**(0.06) 72
22 Publishing, printing and media 0.32*(0.14) 69
23 Coke, refined petroleum products, nuclear fuel - 11
24 Chemicals and chemical products -0.009 (0.04) 189
25 Rubber and plastic products 0.24**(0.05) 86
26 Other non metallic mineral products -0.15 (0.06) 197
27 Basic metals 0.183*(0.09) 148
28 Fabricated metal products 0.18**(0.018) 256
29 Machinery and equipment n.e.c. 0.38**(0.049) 403
30 Office machinery and computers 0.099 (0.10) 14
31 Electrical machinery and apparatus n.e.c. 0.007 (0.013) 176
32 Radio, TV and communication equipment 0.67**(0.13) 52
33 Medical, precision and optical instruments 0.48**(0.11) 38
34 Motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers 0.24**(0.05) 58
35 Other transport equipment 0.79**(0.11) 39
36 Furniture, manufacturing n.e.c. 0.33**(0.05) 197
Note: the number of observations increases substantially as no information is used on
capital, which is often missing in the data.45
Table A2: Estimates of Market Power in Romanian Manufacturing, Assuming
Capital is fixed (fixed effects results)
NACE Code Description Lerner Index Nr. Obs.
- All manufacturing 0.10**(0.004) 6946
15 Food and Beverages 0.069**(0.007) 1527
16 Tobacco -
17 Textiles 0.23**(0.017) 763
18 Wearing apparel; fur 0.21**(0.027) 617
19 Leather, luggage and footwear 0.16**(0.048) 268
20 Wood, straw and plaiting materials 0.26**(0.03) 282
21 Pulp, paper and paper products 0.24**(0.05) 78
22 Publishing, printing and media -0.10* (0.04) 114
23 Coke, refined petroleum products, nuclear fuel 0.51**(0.047) 40
24 Chemicals and chemical products 0.19**(0.02) 72
25 Rubber and plastic products 0.43**(0.044) 219
26 Other non metallic mineral products 0.39**(0.02) 112
27 Basic metals 0.32**(0.020) 211
28 Fabricated metal products 0.20**(0.019) 498
29 Machinery and equipment n.e.c. 0.27**(0.029) 581
30 Office machinery and computers 0.33**(0.035) 33
31 Electrical machinery and apparatus n.e.c. -0.20**(0.03) 140
32 Radio, TV and communication equipment 0.25**(0.05) 59
33 Medical, precision and optical instruments -0.003 (0.042) 88
34 Motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers 0.17**(0.017) 161
35 Other transport equipment 0.38**(0.03) 122
36 Furniture, manufacturing n.e.c. 0.03**(0.006) 447
Note: the number of observations increases substantially as no information is used on
capital, which is often missing in the data. 
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